Tag Archives: Peirce

Special Issue: “Pragmatism and Psychologism” Feat. Charles Sanders Peirce on Experimental Psychology

The most recent issue of the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy is devoted to “Pragmatism and Psychologism.” Edited by Rosa M. Calcaterra and Roberta Dreon the issue includes a number of articles that may be of interest to AHP readers, including a piece on Charles Sanders Peirce (right) and experimental psychology. Full details below.

“Introduction to Pragmatism and Psychologism,” by Rosa M. Calcaterra and Roberta Dreon. No Abstract.

“Anti-Psychologism and Neutrality: The Radical Empiricism of Husserl and James,” by Roberta Lanfredini. Abstract:

Both the phenomenology of Husserl and the pragmatist phenomenology of James can be categorized by the formula “radical empiricism,” which is explicit in James and implicit, but no less pervasive, in Husserl. For both of them, radical empiricism is additionally conjoined with an equally radical anti-psychologism. The problem is that the two terms “radical empiricism” and “anti-psychologism” take on a radically different meaning in the two authors. This essay aims to investigate the structural differences between two perspectives that, while following completely different courses, seem to share the same objective: to elaborate a philosophy which at no point moves away from the experiential plane.

“Psychologism and the Self,” by Vincente Sanfelix Vidarte. Abstract: Continue reading Special Issue: “Pragmatism and Psychologism” Feat. Charles Sanders Peirce on Experimental Psychology

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Pragmatism in History

Sami PihlströmIn the Spring 2008 issue of Perspectives on Science, 16(1), Finish philosopher Sami Pihlström raises an interesting question: How many disagreements result solely from a different perspective of what counts as real? He uses the history of pragmatism as a case to make his point.

Pragmatism, originating with Charles Peirce’s writings on the pragmatic maxim in the 1870s, is a background both for scientific realism and, via the views of William James and John Dewey, for the relativist and/or constructivist forms of neopragmatism that have often been seen as challenging the very ideas of scientific rationality and objectivity. The paper shows how the issue of realism arises in pragmatist philosophy of science and how some pragmatists, classical and modern, have attempted to deal with it…. It is argued that the pragmatist tradition cannot avoid these tensions but is largely constituted by them.

This presents not only an interesting perspective on an aspect of what is typically included in our discipline’s history, but it also suggests some interesting ways to think about how we do history: Continue reading Pragmatism in History

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